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INTRODUCTION
In an age where information has become as significant as
any natural resource, data remains fiercely constrained by
protectionism. Whether out of genuine, yet misunderstood,
concerns for privacy and cybersecurity or because of simple,
unabashed protectionist instincts, countries around the world
have pursued policies designed to impede cross-border data flows,
localize data, and stifle digital trade. These digital trade
barriers—such as, requiring data on citizens of a country to be
stored in country rather than on overseas servers—increase
costs, cut against competition (especially for small Internet-based
businesses), and frustrate innovation.
As countries continue to erect digital trade barriers, the
value of the global information flow diminishes. While a recent
report by the U.S. International Trade Commission estimates
that the Internet improves the productivity of digitally intense
industries by 7.8% to 10.9%,1 barriers from the European Union
(“EU”) to China pose a direct challenge and potential impediment
to that productivity. Data localization requirements and
restrictions on cross-border data flows, perhaps more than any
other digital trade barrier, impede the next generation of
international trade facilitation—cloud computing. In recent
years, cloud traffic has increased from 3.5 to 5.6 zettabytes2 and
will reach 10.4 zettabytes by 2019.3 Cloud computing is
particularly useful because it “provides portability” and “allows
for more seamless upgrades and transitions to new or multiple
devices, because content does not need to be laboriously copied
from one device to another.”4
However, the success of cloud computing, and electronic
commerce at large hinges on a global distribution of servers.
Lack of servers and enormous distances between them can be the
cause of lethargic delivery times, which undermines international
trade.5 Therefore, restrictions on digital trade frustrate the
* The views expressed herein belong solely to me. I would like to thank Patrick
Holvey, Al Gidari, Bill Watson, and Carolyn Iodice for their advice and wisdom.
1 Digital Trade in the U.S. and Global Economies, Part 2, Inv. No. 332-540, USITC
Pub. 4485, at 65 (Aug. 2014) (Final).
2 A zettabyte is one trillion gigabytes. See Thomas Barnett, Jr., The Zettabyte
Era Officially Begins (How Much is That?), CISCO BLOG (Sept. 9, 2016),
https://blogs.cisco.com/sp/the-zettabyte-era-officially-begins-how-much-is-that
[http://perma.cc/X8YT-QFDB].
3 Markham C. Erickson & Sarah K. Leggin, Exporting Internet Law Through
International Trade Agreements: Recalibrating U.S. Trade Policy in the Digital Age, 24
CATH. U. J.L. & TECH 317, 333 (2016).
4 Id. at 334.
5 See Steven R. Swanson, Google Set Sail: Ocean-Based Server Farms and
International Law, 43 CONN. L. REV. 709, 715, 741 (2011).
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distribution of the global network needed to make e-commerce and
Internet-enabled international trade successful. Since it would be
difficult for a state to block access to individual users,
governments instead seek to control the flow of data higher up
the chain, usually at the level of certain intermediaries like
Internet Service Providers.6 While reducing these barriers is a
useful and necessary tool towards protecting free Internetenabled commerce, it is also a traditional solution.
This article proposes an unconventional solution to the
problem of digital trade restrictions: digital trade zones. Digital
trade zones would be areas in which a country would forbear
from jurisdiction over certain Internet and privacy laws in order
to permit innovative arrangements between countries as a means
of circumventing otherwise impeding digital trade restrictions.
To date there has not been any discussion of creating special
jurisdictions for the trade and treatment of data.7
This article lays a foundation for such a discussion. Part I
highlights the key impediments to digital trade. Part II discusses
the theoretical foundation of digital trade zones, analogizing this
framework to both maritime law and Foreign Trade Zones
(“FTZs”) in the United States, each a key ingredient needed to
make digital trade zones function. Part III anticipates successes
and problems posed by digital trade zones in practice by
presenting some of the potential mechanics of digital trade zones
in the United States. Specifically, it proposes two types of
zones—experimental zones and waystation zones—addressing,
respectively, the impediments created by restrictions on crossborder data flows and data localization. Part III also contains a
discussion of the ways in which digital trade zones offer answers
to some common intellectual property rights violations frequently
encountered in the course of trade. The Conclusion summarizes
the work and proposes next steps to further the discussion.
I. IMPEDIMENTS TO DIGITAL TRADE
From galleons to gigabytes, international trade has come a
long way.8 Producers and consumers can be instantaneously
connected, and the flow of information across the globe has
facilitated a commercial revolution. While the world is more
See id. at 719.
A single article does discuss treating the emerging internet ecosystem broadly as a
single “digital free trade zone.” See Kristi L. Bergemann, A Digital Free Trade Zone and
Necessarily-Regulated Self-Governance for Electronic Commerce: The World Trade
Organization, International Law, and Classical Liberalism in Cyberspace, 20 JOHN
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 595, 629 (2002).
8 From pieces of eight to 8-bit also hits the tone I am going for.
6
7
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connected than ever, barriers to digital trade are being erected at
an alarming pace. Despite the myriad of challenges facing
individuals and industry engaging in e-commerce, three of the
most common digital trade restrictions are data localization,
restrictions on cross-border data flows, and intellectual property
rights infringement.9
A. Data Localization
Data localization refers to mandates that require companies
to engage in digital trade-related activities inside of the
particular country in order to do business in that country.10
Sometimes called “data nationalism,” data localization is an
extreme attempt by a government to restrict the flow of data
from escaping beyond its control and its borders. Data
localization can be contrasted with historical Internet border
controls; while previous controls were mainly designed to keep
information from entering a country, localization efforts build on
this by preventing data from leaving.11
The most common localization efforts require that data
storage facilities house data in the country or jurisdiction that
originates the data.12 For example, in 2015, Russia required that
data collected by companies on Russian citizens be both
processed and stored within Russia.13 While there is still
uncertainty about how the law will be implemented, the outlook
for such localization requirements is not good. This is because
Russia currently lacks the server capacity to shoulder the
demand for data storage as required by the law.14
China also has localization restrictions aimed at cloud
computing. Given its geographic agnosticism, cloud computing is
frequently an unfortunate first casualty of data localization. In
China, cloud computing is closed to foreign-invested companies
and the country is presently seeking to limit foreign companies
from offering cloud computing services if they are cross-border

9 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT
FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS (2017) [hereinafter NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT]
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2017/NTE/2017%20NTE.pdf
[http://perma.cc/YL6U-DT56].
10 Digital Trade in the U.S. and Global Economies, Part 1, Inv. No. 332-531, USITC
Pub. 4415 (July 2013) (Final).
11 Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677,
679 (2015).
12 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, KEY BARRIERS TO DIGITAL TRADE
(Mar. 2017), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2017/march/keybarriers-digital-trade [http://perma.cc/BWV4-VU7A].
13 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 382.
14 Id.

ON
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services.15 But localization is not limited to tyrannical regimes.
Even Canada has caught the localization bug. British Columbia
and Nova Scotia both have laws that require that personal
information possessed by public institutions such as schools,
universities, or hospitals must be stored and accessed only
in Canada.16
Localization requirements such as these can be incredibly
costly to service providers and consumers. Since, at its most
extreme, localization could require a provider to construct
physical data infrastructure in every jurisdiction where it does
business, one can begin to imagine the expense that such
requirements place on the private sector and the limitations
they pose for global investment and business expansion. In
Brazil, for example, a data center costs on average $60.9
million.17 Even in the United States, construction of a data
center can exceed $40 million.18 In countries with more
burdensome regulatory environments, construction costs could
be even higher. For example, Chinese localization efforts could
cost as much as 1.1% of the nation’s gross domestic product.19
B. Cross-Border Data Flow Restrictions
Less extreme than data localization, restrictions on the flow
of data across borders encompass a host of activities and
regulations designed to impede information exchange. By
limiting what types of data can be exported and how data flow
restrictions can frustrate a broad range of e-commerce activities,
banks may be unable to transfer data between international
branches, and big data analysis may be limited by turning off the
information spigot to companies that rely on cutting-edge
marketing strategies.20 Even individuals can be implicated by
cross-border data flow restrictions. Consider that fifty-eight
percent of eBay revenue comes from outside the United States
and that Airbnb operates in more than 65,000 cities and 191
countries.21 Consumers and companies in the United States are
Id. at 89.
Id. at 72.
Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Breaking the Web: Data Localization vs. the
Global Internet (Univ. of Cal. Davis Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 378, 2014).
18 See id.
19 Matthias Bauer et al., The Costs of Data Localisation: Friendly Fire on Economic
Recovery, EUROPEAN CTR. FOR INT’L POL. ECON. 2 (2014).
20 See RACHEL G. FEFER, SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR & WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG.
RES. SERV., R44565, DIGITAL TRADE AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 13 (2017).
21 Craig Smith, 70 Amazing eBay Statistics and Facts, DMR, https://expanded
ramblings.com/index.php/ebay-stats/ [http://perma.cc/6UME-GT3R] (last updated Feb. 3,
2018); About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us [http://perma.cc/7DHL-67JP]
(last visited Nov. 9, 2017).
15
16
17
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connecting with international markets in a variety of innovative
ways; they too can be entrepreneurially constrained by digital
trade restrictions.
Restrictions on cross-border data flows are varied. Many are
already familiar with China’s Great Firewall, which blocks
websites such as Twitter, Google, and Facebook.22 In a recently
issued policy, “On Cleaning up and Regulating Internet Access
Services Market,” China prohibits telecommunications carriers
from permitting consumers access to virtual private network
connections to contact data centers abroad.23 The European
Union is considering proposals on contract rules for digital
content, such as streaming services and for goods sold online.
Ostensibly designed to address “defective” content purchased
online, it remains to be seen how this will limit the ability of U.S.
providers to conduct digital business in Europe or lead to a
bifurcation of service into separate geographic zones. These are
just a handful of the numerous international limitations on data
flows that threaten the free exchange of information throughout
the world.
The numerousness of limits on cross-border data flows make
the costliness of compliance with such efforts unsurprising. The
Great Firewall blocks eleven of the top twenty-five global
websites, and estimates place the total number of blocked sites at
3000.24 This costs individuals and organizations countless dollars
a year in lost business. Given the acceleration of cloud
computing—twenty-two percent of OECD-based businesses25 use
cloud computing services—limiting the ability of the cloud to
serve different populations easily is an expensive proposition.26
Moreover, much of the value that comes from data is increasingly
made by gleaning insights from data in real time.27 Curtailing
that real time analysis means placing an upper limit on a core
part of data’s intrinsic usefulness. Imagine a farmer relying on
Internet-enabled equipment to plant crops more precisely. If that
farmer is located in a country which limits his access to the
cloud, the data he is simultaneously producing as he plants
cannot be easily transformed from raw to useful information to
make his activity more precise. Or consider the aircraft
NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 90.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 90.
OECD stands for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Expanding U.S. Digital Trade and Eliminating Barriers to Digital Exports:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 114th Cong.
3 (2016) (statement of Robert D. Atkinson, President, Information Technology and
Innovation Foundation) [hereinafter Atkinson Testimony].
27 Id. at 2.
22
23
24
25
26
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manufacturing industry. A Boeing 737 engine produces twenty
terabytes of data per hour.28 Boeing utilizes this enormous
amount of data to enhance safety and reduce flight delays.
Boeing’s Airplane Health Management system is used by
commercial airlines that operate Boeing aircraft in real time to
assess and mitigate potential aircraft problems.29 Given that
crossing borders is core to an aircraft’s purpose, the success of
this entire endeavor is rooted in Boeing’s ability to move
enormous amounts of data around the globe quickly and
effortlessly. It is estimated that the Internet of Things, such as
Boeing’s engines, other industrial machines, and consumer
electronics, will yield $11.1 trillion per year in economic impact.30
Data flow limitations cut directly into that figure, threatening
one of the largest potential additions to economic productivity in
the coming years.
C. Intellectual Property Rights Infringement
Internet-enabled trade has simultaneously created new
markets for intellectual property rights (“IPR”) and caused a
great proliferation of IPR infringement. Frequently, Internet
piracy is named as a key trade barrier, including foreign
countries hosting websites that post pirated content or connect
people to such stolen content.31 According to the U.S. Trade
Representative, who issues lists of countries that are serial IPR
violators, the countries on the “priority watch list” span the
globe, including Algeria, Argentina, Chile, China, India,
Indonesia, Kuwait, Russia, Thailand, Ukraine, and Venezuela.32
Infringement of IPR can take many forms. Often times,
foreign websites will host pirated or stolen content. For example,
MP3VA.com is a site based in Russia and Ukraine that sells
unauthorized U.S. audio recordings.33 The site registers more
than 860,000 visits per month, with most of the visits coming

28 See John B. Maggiore, Remote Management of Real-Time Airplane Data, BOEING
(2007), http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/articles/qtr_3_07/AERO_Q307_
article4.pdf [http://perma.cc/T9BS-GL4Z]; Paul Mathai, Big Data: Catalyzing Performance
in Manufacturing, WIPRO 3 (2011), https://www.wipro.com/content/dam/nexus/en/industries/
process%20and-industrial-manufacturing/latest-thinking/2606-Big%20Data%20-%20Copy.pdf
[http://perma.cc/KXA4-M89Y].
29 Atkinson Testimony, supra note 27, at 6.
30 Id. at 3.
31 FEFER, AKHTAR & MORRISON, supra note 20, at 16.
32 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 SPECIAL 301 REPORT (2017)
[hereinafter SPECIAL 301 REPORT] https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/301/2017%20Special
%20301% 20Report%20FINAL.PDF [http://perma.cc/LW35-7L6X].
33 Id.
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from the United States.34 A similar website is uploaded.net,
which gives users access to different kinds of copyrighted
content, such as movies, music, and books. Hosted in the
Netherlands, uploaded.com uses a creative arrangement to make
money whereby users receive greater compensation for the
greater size of the file they pirate and load to the website. 35
Another website is taobao.com, an e-commerce platform that sells
many counterfeit products. Taobao.com is one of the top websites
in China.36 Another example of IPR infringement is the theft of
trade secrets. China is a repeat offender on this issue. While
China has taken steps to address the theft of trade secrets,
including amendments to the General Provisions of the Civil Law
in March 2017 that extended civil intellectual property protection
to trade secrets, there remains a long way to go.37 This includes
improving options for the use of preliminary injunctions and
protections against frivolous trade secret litigation claims which
can be used to gain advantage in unrelated disputes.38
Given the expansiveness of the Internet and the ease with
which it facilitates IPR infringement, IPR infringement is
exceptionally costly. Some estimate that Internet-enabled IPR
infringement could be greater than the total volume of sales
“through traditional channels such as street vendors and other
physical markets.”39 An OECD study places trade in fake goods
at $461 billion or 2.5% of global trade, and it has been noted that
“the total magnitude of counterfeiting and piracy worldwide in all
forms appears to be approaching, if not surpassing, the trillion
dollar mark.”40
D. Motivations to Limit Digital Trade
The motivation to limit digital trade to prevent violations of
IPR may appear the most straightforward—preventing the raw
profiteering from the sale of stolen goods. However, when it
comes to other barriers to digital trade, the motivations are
somewhat more opaque. Data flow restrictions and associated

34 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2016 OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF
NOTORIOUS MARKETS 9 (Dec. 2016) [hereinafter Notorious Markets] https://ustr.gov/sites/
default/ files/2016-Out-of-Cycle-Review-Notorious-Markets.pdf [http://perma.cc/LMT2-RZ6K].
35 Id. at 14.
36 See id. at 12.
37 See SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 32, at 30.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 13.
40 OFFICE OF THE INTELL. PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, U.S. JOINT STRATEGIC
P LAN ON I NTELLECTUAL P ROPERTY E NFORCEMENT FY 2017–2019, at 20 (2016),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/IPEC/2016jointstrategicplan.pdf
[http://perma.cc/U68K-6FUQ].
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localization requirements have been enacted for a myriad of
reasons by various countries.
The most common rationales respond to fears that sharing
data abroad will open such data up to surveillance by foreign
governments. This public motivation stems from dual desires to
protect the privacy of the country’s own citizens and a
protectionist motivation to stimulate domestic technology and
Internet companies. In the wake of the Snowden revelations,
countries, including India and the EU, have pursued various
efforts to guard against U.S. surveillance.41 Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa (collectively known as the “BRICS
countries”) have also sought to create a series of global
transmission cables intended to be “a network free of U.S.
eavesdropping.”42 From a civil liberties perspective, some have
commented that centralizing data within certain countries only
makes it easier for domestic agencies and law enforcement to spy
on their own citizens by concentrating citizens’ data more
closely.43 The veracity of claims that localization and data flow
restrictions are primarily rooted in concern over foreign
surveillance belongs in a paper all its own, and it is worth noting
that some have pushed back against this notion by arguing that
surveillance concerns are a veneer for what is ultimately digital
protectionism against mostly American companies.44
Regardless of motivations, these efforts have demonstrated
protectionist effects. Governments may believe that by limiting
foreign competition, which is often American competition given the
United States’ technological and commercial dominance, a
domestic technology industry may flourish. However, governments
around the world have worried about the impediments this logic
poses to the information economy globally. The OECD has asked
countries to abstain from “barriers to the location, access and use
of cross-border data facilities and functions” in order to “ensure
cost effectiveness and other efficiencies.”45 In a survey of domestic
companies, the Swedish National Board of Trade concluded that
“trade cannot happen without data being moved from one location
to another.”46
See Chander & Le, supra note 17, at 10, 28.
Id. at 28.
See id. at 30. Chander and Le refer to this as the “Honeypot” problem. Id.
See Christopher Kuner, Data Nationalism and its Discontents, 64 EMORY L.J.
ONLINE 2089, 2094–95 (2015).
45 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., OECD COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION ON
PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNET POLICY MAKING 7 (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.oecd.org/
sti/ieconomy/49258588.pdf [http://perma.cc/BA4E-LLDA].
46 The National Board of Trade, No Transfer, No Trade – the Importance of CrossBorder Data Transfer for Companies Based in Sweden, 1 KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM 23 (2014).
41
42
43
44
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II. DIGITAL TRADE ZONES IN THEORY
Digital trade zones possess two core theoretical
tenets—freedom from data nationalism and existence as
jurisdictions legally “outside” the territory of a country. Since
digital trade zones do not presently exist, examination and
understanding of these concepts is best done by analogy. The
first tenet is demonstrated, in its purest form, on the high seas
where nations are unable to exercise restrictions on the
movement of Internet information. The second tenet is more real.
FTZs in the United States offer a well-tested and successful
framework to understand some of the basic mechanics of digital
trade zones.
A. The High Seas
At their core, digital trade zones (just like all special
jurisdictions) are areas with unique rules. While these are
manmade creations, the distinction of being an original special
jurisdiction belongs to the open ocean. Since there are no
established digital trade zones from which to highlight, this
Section returns to the sea in order to share by analogy how
digital trade zones might be arranged.
1. The Precedent of Pirate Radio
In response to content restrictions imposed by the British
Broadcasting Corporation, disc jockeys and music promoters
started what was known as pirate radio and began to pipe rock n’
roll music into Great Britain from vessels stationed in
international waters.47 These vessels, and some old naval forts
located outside British territorial waters that were used for
broadcasting, were usually anchored to the seafloor and supplied
by tenders from the mainland.48 In 1966, the most popular pirate
broadcasters, Radio Caroline and Radio London, boasted an
audience of over eight million listeners.49 And Britain was not
alone; the Netherlands had its share of pirate stations as well.50
At the time the pirate broadcasters were operating,
controlling law was the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High

47 See Kimberley Peters, Taking More-Than-Human Geographies to Sea: Ocean
Natures and Offshore Radio Piracy, in WATER WORLDS: HUMAN GEOGRAPHIES OF THE
OCEAN 177, 178–80 (Jon Anderson & Kimberley Peters eds., 2014).
48 See id. at 182–83.
49 Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The Suppression of Pirate Radio Broadcasting: A Test
Case of the International System for Control of Activities Outside National Territory, 45
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 75 (1982).
50 See id. at 76.
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Seas.51 This agreement did not approve or prohibit an explicit
right to broadcast from the high seas. 52 In fact, the Convention
only lists four core nautical freedoms: navigation, fishing,
laying of pipelines and cables, and flight. 53 Some argue that so
long as broadcasting or any other activity did not interfere
with any of these four freedoms, it would be permissible under
the Convention. 54
Despite the apparent security offered under the Geneva
Convention, pirate broadcasters were still targets of British and
European authorities. To circumvent these authorities, the pirate
broadcasters were known to fly a flag of convenience. These flags
belonged to states that lacked the ability or will to hold pirate
broadcasters accountable for their transmissions.55 Coastal
countries, like Great Britain, could not exercise authority over
pirate broadcasters flying flags of convenience because only the
flag state possesses sole jurisdiction over its vessels.56 Early on,
pirate radio learned the vital lesson that finding flags of
convenience was necessary to avoid collapsing into the
jurisdiction of the country which the pirates were attempting to
avoid. Similarly, an embryonic digital trade zone—embodied in
an oceangoing data center—would need to find a suitable flag of
convenience to be able to exist apart from the onerous trade
restrictions it seeks to evade.
In an effort to punish pirate broadcasters, the 1965
European Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts
Transmitted from Stations Outside National Territories
(“European Pirate Radio Agreement”) required “that signatory
flag states punish pirate broadcasters found on their own
ships.”57 The European Pirate Radio Agreement did not
establish a new form of jurisdiction, however. Instead, it aimed
to strengthen enforcement by targeting “acts of collaboration,”
such as the provision or maintenance of the vessels, the
provision of supplies to the broadcasters, and the provision of
advertising to fund the pirate stations. 58 Even though the
vessels and transmitters were themselves beyond reach of

Id. at 79.
See id.
53 See Convention on the High Seas art. 2, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450
U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter Convention on the High Seas].
54 See Robertson, supra note 49, at 79.
55 See Robert C. F. Rueland, Note, Interference with Non-National Ships on the High
Seas: Peacetime Exceptions to the Exclusivity Rule of Flag-State Jurisdiction, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1161, 1225 (1989).
56 See Swanson, supra note 5, at 739.
57 Id.
58 Robertson, supra note 49, at 95.
51
52
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European governments, the network of logistical, financial, and
human support for pirate radio was not.
Pirate radio was effectively extinguished in the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).
Article 109 gives states, even those who are not the flag states
of a broadcasting vessel, power to arrest “any person or
ship engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and seize the
broadcasting apparatus.”59
Pirate radio represents an inchoate, primitive digital trade
zone. Seeking to circumvent impediments to the flow of
transmitted information, individuals took to the seas. In
international waters, these pirate broadcasters were able to
successfully carve out space and challenge state-owned radio
corporations, much in the same way digital trade zones seek
to challenge the protectionist impulses of data localization
and cross-border data flow restrictions, but this time with
state approval.
2. The Legal Status of Oceanic Data Centers
Pirate radio offers an instructive case study about the
potential, as well as the limits, of using the ocean as a means of
bypassing territorial laws limiting the flow of information.
However, to understand the theory that gives purpose to digital
trade zones, the pirate radio analogy must be improved by
considering the effect of putting servers on the seas. Can
territorial restrictions on the flow of information be circumvented
by placing the data on a vessel in the ocean?
For a time, Google pursued barge-based server farms that
would deliver computing power throughout the world. In 2009,
Google was granted a patent for a “water-based data center.”60
Using the ocean to power and cool a data center could potentially
mean operating the facility much more cheaply at sea than on
land. While there are doubts about the technological feasibility of
such server ships, it may nonetheless be possible for a data
center to maintain a degree of independence from national
Internet restrictions by remaining at sea.61

59 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. At present, the United States has signed but not ratified
UNCLOS and treats parts of the agreement as customary international law.
60 U.S. Patent No. 7,525,207 (filed Feb. 26, 2007) (issued Apr. 28, 2009).
61 See Tim Worstall, Google’s Offshore Data Centres Won’t Be Out of the NSA’s Reach,
Nor the US Government’s, FORBES (Oct. 27, 2013, 9:25 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/timworstall/2013/10/27/googles-offshore-data-centres-wont-be-out-of-the-nsas-reach-northe-us-governments/#3e87c3787536 [http://perma.cc/6GGG-25VH].
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Such was the case when the Swedish website, Pirate Bay,
attempted to purchase an old British naval fort located outside
the country’s territorial waters in order to avoid law enforcement
attempts to shut down the website.62 While this attempted
acquisition was for nefarious purposes, it underscores the
interest in, and potential of, efforts to find places where digital
restrictions do not apply. The fort, known as Sealand, had been
previously used as a pirate radio base and claims a modicum of
sovereignty.63 Referred to as “a near-perfect embodiment of
a data haven,” Sealand has already tested its independence
in cyberspace by hosting HavenCo, a provider of online
gambling services.64
Building upon the lessons learned by pirate broadcasters and
Sealanders alike, floating data centers would have to adhere to
two important requirements at minimum. These vessels would
have to remain on the high seas and would need to fly the flag of
some nation.
UNCLOS applies several degrees of territoriality to the
ocean.65 Of these several degrees, only the final the high
seas offers sufficient freedom from the prescriptive and
enforcement jurisdiction of national governments to be of use in
the intellectual development of digital trade zones. The high seas
begin where a country’s exclusive economic zone ends; 200 miles
from the shore.66 On the high seas, a state that is not the flag
state of the vessel in question can exercise jurisdiction over a
ship in international waters only in very limited circumstances
such as if the ship is engaged in piracy or poses a specific threat
to national security.67 One would hope that operating a cloud
computing service at an offshore data center would not fall into

62 See Jan Libbenga, The Pirate Bay plans to buy Sealand, THE REGISTER
(Jan. 12, 2007, 2:44 PM), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/01/12/pirate_bay_buys_island/
[http://perma.cc/LHZ8-W3DY].
63 See Kevin Fayle, Sealand Ho! Music Pirates, Data Havens, and the Future of
International Copyright Law, 28 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 247, 261 (2005). Since it
lacks the permanent population and capacity to pursue diplomatic relations, Sealand is
unable to fully achieve sovereign recognition. Id. However, Sealand has been
acknowledged to have a degree of sovereignty. Id. An English court found that Great
Britain did not have jurisdiction over Sealand, and in 1978, the residents of Sealand lost
the fort to German and Dutch nationals before they were able to recapture the fort in an
air assault. Id. The Dutch and German invaders were then held as prisoners of war. Id.;
see also Andrew H. E. Lyon, The Principality of Sealand, and Its Case for Sovereign
Recognition, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 637, 642–43 (2015).
64 Fayle, supra note 63, at 262.
65 The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea specifies these zones as internal
waters, territorial seas, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, the continental shelf,
and the high seas. Swanson, supra note 5, at 727–38.
66 UNCLOS, supra note 59, at 40.
67 See id. at 53–54.
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these categories, though countries such as China, which have
highly restrictive Internet regimes, may argue otherwise.
While the high seas offer a forum free from territorial data
protectionism, a floating data center would also need, just like
the pirate radio broadcasters of yore, to identify with a flag state
in order to be protected against unwanted boarding and seizure.
International law is explicit that a ship not flying the flag of a
country is considered to be operating beyond the law.68 The flag
state, to the contrary, enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over the vessel
flying its flag, thus “[h]aving a nationality actually protects the
ship from other states’ jurisdiction and lets the flag state exercise
diplomatic protection over the vessel.”69
Therefore, the operator of an oceangoing data center would
want to select a flag state under which to operate the vessel.
Options are not just limited to the United States or a company’s
nation of incorporation, but also a host of nations offering their
flags for sale. Countries offering flags of convenience include
Panama, Liberia, the Bahamas, and Bermuda.70 Organizations
usually select flags of convenience because of the light-regulatory
touch and low taxes found in these nations.71 However, in order
to access markets with greater Internet regulatory schemes,
especially when it comes to privacy, the operators of a floating
data center may wish to choose a country that mimics the data
protection regime of the jurisdiction within which they hope to
conduct business. As such, operators of floating data centers may
wish to affiliate with EU member states or Canada.
3. Applicability to Digital Trade Zones
The hypothetical treatment of data on the high seas offers
two instructive lessons for digital trade zones. First, in order to
be successful, a digital trade zone should attempt to mimic the
legal conditions found on the high seas as much as possible. The
digital trade zone should be a space free from territorial
regulation on the flow of data; the digital trade zone should serve
as a neutral zone separate and apart from domestic data
restrictions. Just as it is for other special jurisdictions,
extraterritoriality is important, and given the difficultly of
operating data centers out in the ocean, replicating those legal
conditions on land is core to the digital trade zones project.
Second, digital trade zones still must be located somewhere in
68 See Sean Hickman, Flagging Options for Seasteading Projects, THE SEASTEADING
INSTITUTE 3 (Mar. 2012).
69 Swanson, supra note 5, at 735–36.
70 Hickman, supra note 68, at 8.
71 Id. at 3.
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order to benefit from a broader rule of law. This is similar to how
a floating data center would need to select a flag state to avoid
the predations attendant to being a stateless vessel on the high
seas. Just as some flag states are more convenient for different
operations, the United States likely offers the best conditions for
digital trade zones, as it possesses a history of well-regarded
privacy protection, a vibrant Internet industry, a strong rule of
law, and a history of operating special jurisdictions. The
advantages conferred on the first mover in this field would also
be substantial, and policy makers may wish to work towards
capturing these benefits.
B. U.S. Foreign Trade Zones
While the high seas offer an analogous way to think about
the legal status of digital trade zones, FTZs in the United States
offer direct insight into the mechanics of their digital trade
counterparts. Created by the U.S. Congress in 1934, FTZs permit
the occupants of the zone to defer customs duties and excise
taxes on goods brought into the zone.72 FTZs have proven to be
successful special jurisdictions in the United States and as such
offer a template from which to model their digital cousins.
1. The Purpose of Foreign Trade Zones
The purpose of FTZs is to prove an incentive for siting
certain manufacturing functions within the United States. FTZs
promote “importation for the purpose of conditioning or
combining foreign goods with domestic products prior to
exporting the finished products to foreign markets, rather than
retaining them for domestic consumption.”73 At present, most
activity in FTZs is manufacturing. Since their creation, the
number of FTZs has proliferated. Before 1970, there were only
ten cities with zones.74 Today, there are over 200 approved
zones.75 Domestic inputs into zones account for fifty-eight
percent of inputs while forty-two percent of inputs come from
foreign sources.76

19 U.S.C. § 81c(a) (2012).
Barbara M. Sheppard, Foreign Trade Zones – International Business Incentives, 7
GA. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 669, 670 (1977).
74 See John J. DaPonte, Jr., The Foreign Trade Zones Act: Keeping Up with the
Changing Times, BUS. AM., Dec. 1997, at 22.
75 See US Foreign Trade Zones, EXPORT.GOV (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.export.gov/
article?id=US-Foreign-Trade-Zones [http://perma.cc/MR9K-8G4Z].
76 MARY JANE BOLLE & BROCK R. WILLIAMS, CONG. RES. SERV., R42686, U.S.
FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 7 (2013).
72
73
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2. The Structure of Foreign Trade Zones
The most unique factor of FTZs is that they exist outside of
U.S customs territory.77 This allows FTZs to offer duty deferral
on goods entering the zones. Customs duties are only paid when
the imported goods are actually transported into U.S. customs
territory.78 In this way, FTZs represent more of a “procedure”
than an actual physical demarcated place.79 While all the zones
are exempt from the same customs procedures, the zones are
hardly homogenous, ranging from large, sprawling facilities to
single warehouses.80
Applications for FTZs are reviewed by the Foreign Trade
Zones Board. Located within the U.S. Department of Commerce,
the Board is made up of the Secretary of Commerce and the
Secretary of the Treasury.81 The Board has an Executive Secretary
to lead the daily operations.82 The Board examines and, where
appropriate, approves applications for new FTZ designations and
then grants the designation to local governments or non-profit
corporations, which then create and maintain the zone as a public
utility.83 Customs and Border Protection oversees all activities and
collects all revenues from FTZs.84
3. Foreign Trade Zones Meet Digital Trade Zones
FTZs offer an established model for digital trade zones.
Proposed digital trade zones in the United States would be
established via federal legislation, and organizations would
petition a Digital Trade Zones Board—perhaps also including the
Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of the Treasury as
leaders—for inclusion in the program. Digital trade zones would
be areas where instead of deferring duty collection, the United
States would forbear from various Internet and privacy-related
jurisdictions providing participating organizations the ability to
self-regulate in ways that would satisfy the requirements of
international data markets. Thus, digital trade zones would,
similar to their foreign trade progenitors, be procedures rather
than standard physical locations. Digital trade zones could
be permitted to take a variety of forms and sizes; from the
77 See Tom W. Bell, Special Economic Zones in the United States: From Colonial
Charters, to Foreign-Trade Zones, Toward USSEZs, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 982 (2016).
78 BOLLE & WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 11.
79 DaPonte, supra note 74, at 206.
80 Sheppard, supra note 73, at 670.
81 BOLLE & WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 13.
82 See NAT’L ASS’N OF FOREIGN TRADE ZONES, THE U.S. FOREIGN TRADE ZONES
PROGRAM – PROMOTING TRADE, JOB CREATION & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 5 (2013).
83 Id.
84 See id.
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largest of data centers to the most unusual of Internet
communication arrangements.
III. DIGITAL TRADE ZONES IN PRACTICE
While there may be other applications of digital trade zones,
and their enacting legislation should anticipate and encourage
alternative uses, this article contemplates two practical uses.
These two applications consider digital trade zones as
experiments and digital trade zones as waystations. Both types of
zones would adhere to the general procedures and structures in
Part II. By permitting a country, in this analysis the United
States, to forbear from jurisdiction over a defined area for the
purposes of establishing law governing the Internet or other data
uses unique to the zone, both experimental and transitory zones
would be able to bypass restrictions on cross-border data flows
and data localization requirements.
A. Digital Trade Zones as Experiments
Digital trade zones could also be used to detour around
restrictions on cross-border data flows. This could be done by
creating zones where companies could participate in different
experimental arrangements designed to safeguard consumer
privacy and work towards developing more beneficial
arrangements for the transfer of data across borders.
Digital trade zones as experimental areas are perhaps most
applicable to the relationship between the United States and the
EU. In 2012, U.S. digital exports to the EU were worth $140.6
billion, representing seventy-two percent of all services exports to
the EU.85 Total U.S.–EU trade in goods and services totaled $1
trillion, and U.S. foreign direct investment in the EU amounted
to $2.4 trillion fifty-six percent of total U.S. direct investment
worldwide.86 There are several ways in which the flow of data
across the Atlantic creates such exceptional value. For instance,
many businesses in Europe sell products to and engage
customers in the United States, European firms receive
investment advice from U.S. consultancies, and companies share
data internally from their international subsidiaries.87 This is
similar to how Boeing tracks engine operating data throughout

85 Joshua P. Meltzer, The Importance of the Internet and Transatlantic Data Flows
for U.S. and EU Trade and Investment 12 (Brookings Inst. Glob. Econ. & Dev., Working
Paper No. 79, 2014).
86 See MARTIN A. WEISS & KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RES. SERV., R44257, U.S.-EU
DATA PRIVACY: FROM SAFE HARBOR TO PRIVACY SHIELD 4 (2016).
87 See Meltzer, supra note 85, at 8.
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the world and shares it through its company and with
commercial airlines.
1. Attempts to Preserve U.S.–EU Cross-Border Data Flows
Despite the incredible amount of data driven commerce
between the United States and the EU, the EU’s exceptionally
rigorous data privacy requirements has been a thorn in the side
of U.S.–EU trade relations when it comes to cross-border data
flows. In October 1995, the EU adopted the Data Protection
Directive (“DPD”) to create a unified, comprehensive framework
for data protection.88 The DPD mandates that data on EU
citizens can only leave the EU (and DPD’s protections) if the
destination jurisdiction has a sufficient data protection regime.89
The EU assesses how adequate foreign data protections are by
reviewing the circumstances governing the transfer of data.90
This initially posed problems for the United States, which
lacks the same kind of comprehensive data protection law.
Consumer privacy protection laws in the United States are
“industry specific and vary by sector, with different laws
governing the collection and disclosure of financial data,
health-related data, student information, and motor vehicle
records.”91 Some commentators have noted that, while less
comprehensive on the whole, the alleged patchwork protections
found in the United States form a much more nimble and flexible
response to consumer privacy than the European approach, a
view shared by the Department of Commerce, which maintains
that “[t]he sum of the parts of U.S. privacy protection is equal to
or greater than the single whole of Europe.”92
Despite these reassurances, and in order to maintain
transatlantic data flows, the U.S. and the EU agreed to the Safe
Harbor Agreement in 2000.93 The Safe Harbor Agreement was
the result of negotiations between both sides in order to find an
88 Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Directive
95/46/EC].
89 WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 86, at 2.
90 Id. The EU also focuses on “the nature of the data, the purpose and direction of
the proposed processing operations, the countries of origin, and the final destination of
the data, and that country’s laws, rules, and security measures.” Id.; see also Directive
95/46/EC, supra note 88, at arts. 25–26.
91 WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 86, at 3.
92 Natasha Singer, Data Protection Laws, an Ocean Apart, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/technology/cons umer-data-protection-laws-anocean-apart.html.
93 See U.S. DEP’T OF C OM., U.S.-EU SAFE HARBOR FRAMEWORK; A GUIDE TO SELFCERTIFICATION 3 (2009).
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arrangement that satisfied the “adequate level of protection” for
data mandated by the DPD.94 At its peak, about 4500 U.S.
companies participated in the framework established by the Safe
Harbor Agreement. Participation was open to any U.S.
organization that was regulated by the Federal Trade
Commission and, separately, airlines, even though they are
regulated by the Department of Transportation. This restriction
did limit the Safe Harbor Agreement to these regulated
industries and notably, it did not include U.S. financial or
telecommunications companies.95
The serenity found under the Safe Harbor Agreement was
dashed when in October 2015, the European Court of Justice
struck down Safe Harbor Agreement as insufficient under the
DPD.96 First, the court found that a European Commission
finding that a foreign country—the United States—had sufficient
privacy protections does not supersede and reduce the powers of
EU authorities to assess data privacy protections.97 The
European Court of Justice also determined that because the
European Commission did not investigate “the domestic laws or
international commitment of a third country prior to making a
determination on the adequacy of their data privacy protection,”
the Commission decision adopting the Safe Harbor Agreement
was invalid.98
The bombshell decision was followed by the U.S. and the EU
scrambling to find a new mechanism to protect privacy and then
facilitate transatlantic movement of data as quickly as possible.
In February 2016, the U.S. and the EU announced a replacement
to the Safe Harbor Agreement: the Privacy Shield Framework.99
The Privacy Shield Framework is meant to be a more robust
version of the Safe Harbor Agreement. The Privacy Shield
Framework is characterized by several changes, including
stronger enforcement measures administered by the Department
of Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission, improved
redress for citizens who believe their data has been compromised,
and greater commitments by participating U.S. companies, such
as more detailed notice obligations, prescriptive access rights,
WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 86, at 5.
Id. at 6.
See Scott J. Shackelford, Seeking a Safe Harbor in a Widening Sea: Unpacking the
EJC’s Schrems Decision and What it Means for Transatlantic Relations, SETON HALL J.
DIPL. & INT’L REL. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2–3).
97 See Mira Burri & Rahel Schar, The Reform of the EU Data Protection Framework:
Outlining Key Changes and Assessing Their Fitness for a Data-Driven Economy, 6 J. INFO.
POL’Y 479, 486 (2016).
98 WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 86, at 7.
99 Id. at 9.
94
95
96
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and data retention limits.100 Currently, 2500 organizations
participate in the Privacy Shield Framework.101
In October 2017, the European Commission released a report
announcing that the Privacy Shield Framework continues to
provide sufficient protection under EU law.102 However, this
positive development should not obfuscate concerns that the
Privacy Shield Framework, like the Safe Harbor Agreement
before it, will be eternal. Even at its inception, the EU recognized
“shortcomings” with the framework,103 and with the DPD’s
forthcoming replacement by the General Data Privacy Directive
(“GDPD”) in 2018, questions may once again arise about the
survival of data flow arrangements between the U.S. and the
EU.104 The GDPD has a somewhat more expansive scope
than the DPD—particularly when it comes to territoriality,
data-subject rights, and personal data processing, to name a
few which may mean the currently accepted Privacy Shield
Framework protections will be suddenly out of date when the
GDPD comes into force next year.105 And even without this
worry, litigation relating to another tool available for U.S.
business compliance with the DPD—standard contractual
clauses—has been unceasing since the invalidation of the Safe
Harbor Agreement. Given that this litigation, centered on the
acceptability and protective adequacy of the standard contractual
clauses will continue regardless of the GDPD issue, the Privacy
Shield Framework will continue to face active threats and
challenges for the foreseeable future.106

100 The Judicial Redress Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2015), which was signed into law by
President Obama in February 2016, improved transatlantic trust regarding data flows.
Broadly, the Act aims to include citizens of foreign countries or organizations (like the
EU), which the United States has an agreement with to promote privacy protections.
Similar to the promise offered by digital trade zones, passage of the Judicial Redress Act
was hailed as a turning point in U.S.–EU data relations. See WEISS & ARCHICK, supra
note 86, at 10, 13.
101 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Com., U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross
Welcomes Release of European Commission Report on EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (Oct. 18,
2017), https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2017/10/us-secretary-commerce-wilburross-welcomes-release-european-commissions [http://perma.cc/Z7NZ-PLFB].
102 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the
First Annual Review of the Functioning of the EU–U.S. Privacy Shield, at 2, COM (2017),
611 final (Oct. 18, 2017).
103 WEISS & ARCHICK, supra note 86, at 11.
104 W. Gregory Voss, European Union Data Privacy Law Reform: General Data
Protection Regulation, Privacy Shield, and the Right to Delisting, 72 BUS. LAW. 221,
222 (2017).
105 Id. at 222, 225.
106 See Catherine Muyl, EU Updates on Schrems II and the Privacy Shield, SECURITY,
PRIVACY AND THE LAW (Oct. 2, 2017), http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2017/
10/eu-updates-on-schrems-ii-and-the-privacy-shield/ [http://perma.cc/LCU6-BC4L]. There
is also litigation in France challenging the Privacy Shield Framework. See Les Exégètes
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2. Digital Trade Zones as Experiments
The tense history, and continued fragility, of U.S.–EU data
privacy agreements offers an opportunity for proposed digital
trade zones to shine. While digital trade zones could be viewed as
experimental zones in a variety of ways, this article focuses on
one prominent way in which digital trade zones could be valuable
areas of trade innovation. Currently, any data privacy
arrangement between the U.S. and the EU has to be negotiated
in great detail and would apply to the entirety of both
jurisdictions. The stakes are also exceptionally high; a single
agreement must be, at least at the time of its adoption, near
perfect, or face invalidation.107 And even where an agreement is
successful at fending off legal challenges, these challenges still
undermine the agreement’s stability until resolution, potentially
forestalling quick adoption of the framework.
Digital trade zones could be designed to permit organizations
to experiment with different data privacy arrangements. The
United States could forbear from standard privacy laws in
specified zones. The governing principle in the zones would be a
hybrid privacy regime: U.S. law contextualized by EU
requirements. This would allow several places to experiment
with data privacy arrangements. There are three benefits to
using digital trade zones to experiment with privacy
arrangements in order to circumvent impediments to the
international flow of data. One way this might function would be
if parties, such as the U.S. and EU, negotiated a variety of data
privacy arrangements and then specified specific zones in which
the arrangements would apply. Much like FTZs, these digital
trade zones would be limited to the geographic area around
single companies or server complexes. Interested organizations
would be able to apply to the Department of Commerce to be the
guinea pigs for different privacy arrangements. For participating
companies, the benefits would be clear: access to European
markets that would otherwise be beyond reach. Just as
companies apply to participate in the FTZ program because it
gives them more efficient and less costly access to difficult to
source inputs, companies handling big data would be motivated
to participate in a digital trade zone by the inverse: access to
difficult to reach overseas markets.

Amatuers, Privacy Shield, LES EXÉGÈTES AMATEURS (2016), https://exegetes.eu.org/
dossiers/privacyshield/index.html [http://perma.cc/W324-QP7H].
107 See Graham Greenleaf, International Data Privacy Agreements after the GDPR
and Schrems, 139 PRIVACY L. & BUS. INT’L REP. 6, 8 (noting that a less than perfect
Privacy Shield Framework invites litigation designed to destroy the agreement).
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There are three benefits to using digital trade zones to
experiment with privacy arrangements in order to circumvent
impediments to the international flow of data.
First, experimental digital trade zones would reduce the
currently high stakes of every data protection agreement
negotiation. Since the Safe Harbor Agreement and the Privacy
Shield Framework apply to the entire United States, companies
do not have a choice of participating in some other arrangement.
This means that the stakes are exceptionally high during a
negotiation over a new arrangement or when considering
updating an arrangement. If there were numerous arrangements
in place, any of which could be applied for and to specific local
jurisdictions, the stakes would be lower for each individual
agreement. The U.S. and the EU might be more willing to
experiment with different types of arrangements, perhaps even
limiting the initial number of organizations which could
participate during pilot programs, and would be more likely to
approach agreements in an iterative process, adopting lessons
learned from test agreements and adjusting to developments in
U.S. and EU privacy law.
Relatedly, these zones could act as fail safes in the event
certain regimes were invalidated. With lower stakes and more
experimental agreements spread over different jurisdictions, the
numerousness of digital trade zones would guarantee that if a
single arrangement was invalidated by a U.S. or EU court, other
agreements would still be in place. Indeed, if digital trade zones
are permitted to “stack” agreements, conforming to the most
stringent aspects of every agreement, even where one of the
jurisdiction’s agreements is invalidated, the jurisdiction is still
able to function under other agreements. Consider the creative
commons license system. Just as licensors are able to select
different types of licenses that give them the desired level of
attribution, commercial reuse, and derivativeness, organizations
operating in a digital trade zone would be able to select the data
privacy and legal arrangements that best suit their organization
and the market access it hopes to achieve.108 Modularity means
longevity for transatlantic data agreements. The dispersed
nature of the zones’ agreement frameworks would no longer
necessitate hurried negotiation for global replacements where a
prior regime is withdrawn. Even without an agreement stack,
there would already be other types of model agreements in place

108 See About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/
[http://perma.cc/87JF-EMJP] (last visited Nov. 10, 2017).
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that the parties could draw upon to replace a failed or
invalidated experimental arrangement.
Third, digital trade zones would inject market forces into a
currently bulky, and non-market process. By marketizing data
privacy arrangements, digital trade zones would be more
responsive to consumers while giving greater choice to policy
makers. Right now, consumers can only choose to do U.S.–EU
business with companies complying with the Privacy Shield
Framework. Consumers are not able to choose amongst
companies that might protect their privacy even better under an
experimental arrangement, and companies are not efficiently
incentivized to offer greater or lesser, but more targeted,
protections. Given the privacy concerns that form the basis of
many people’s desire to remain offline or minimize their online
presence, this consumer choice is critical.109 Businesses will also
be interested in such a proposal because it offers a chance to
improve their reputations vis a vis consumers’ privacy desires,
likely in a certification-style manner.110 In this way digital trade
zones can help organizations seeking to operate in Europe, while
also giving consumers a voice in what types of data privacy
arrangements they prefer.
B. Digital Trade Zones as Waystations
While data localization policies are difficult to surmount
because the policies are designed to prohibit the international
movement of data entirely, digital trade zones can still offer an
answer to data localization problems when used as waystations.
These types of digital trade zones would exist to hold data in
transition and would be aimed at addressing localization
initiatives, such as those found in Canada.
1. Data Localization in Canada
As mentioned previously, the Canadian provinces of British
Columbia and Nova Scotia both have serious localization
requirements for public data. Both provinces require that
personal information held by a public organization, such as a
university, hospital, school, or public department, be held in
Canada.111 Moreover, these public entities are prohibited from
using U.S.–based services if there is the chance the data

109 See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and
International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Data Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J.
INT’L. L. 1, 37 (2000).
110 See id. at 35–36.
111 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 72.
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covered by the laws could be “stored in or accessed from the
United States.”112
British Columbia’s localization requirement comes from the
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (“FIPPA”),
an act governing the protection of public information.113 Section
30.1 of FIPPA mandates that “a public body must ensure that
personal information in its custody or under its control is
stored only in Canada and accessed only in Canada.”114 There
are three exceptions: (1) if the individual consents to their
information being stored in or accessed from another
jurisdiction; (2) if the data is stored in or accessed from another
jurisdiction “for the purpose of disclosure allowed under this
Act”; and (3) if the information was disclosed in order make a
payment or resolve an issue surrounding a payment to “the
government of British Columbia or a public body.”115 “Under
FIPPA, a ‘record’ includes books, documents, maps, drawings,
photographs, letters, vouchers, papers and any other thing on
which information is recorded or stored by graphic, electronic,
mechanical or other means.”116
In Nova Scotia, the Personal Information International
Disclosure Protection Act (“PIIDPA”) forms the core of the
province’s localization requirement, since PIIDPA focuses on the
unauthorized disclosure of information specifically beyond
Canada and makes it illegal for information to be stored in, or
accessed from, jurisdictions outside of Canada. There are
exceptions, instances of which are detailed in a report issued by
the government of Nova Scotia.117 For example, energy officials in
Nova Scotia permitted twenty-four staffers to use their
government email while traveling abroad to places like the
United States, Norway, and China.118 The explanation provided
for this exemption from PIIDPA is innocuous and standard: “staff
may be required to monitor their email and voicemail for
business continuity purposes.”119 Almost all the other entries in

Id.
OFFICE OF THE INFO. & PRIVACY COMMISSIONER FOR B.C., GUIDE TO ACCESS AND
PRIVACY PROTECTION UNDER FIPPA 3 (Oct. 2015) [hereinafter FIPPA GUIDE].
114 Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 165 R.S.B.C. § 30.1 (1996).
115 165 R.S.B.C. §§ 30.1, 33.1(1).
116 FIPPA GUIDE, supra note 113, at 7.
117 See Ian Wallace, Privacy: what laws apply in Atlantic Canada?, STEWART MCKELVEY,
http://www.smss.com/abcnewsletter/AEC/2014_Summer/A1.html [http://perma.cc/ML8K-MGG8]
(last visited Nov. 9, 2017).
118 N.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PERSONAL INFORMATION INTERNATIONAL DISCLOSURE
PROTECTION ACT: 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (July 2015).
119 Id.
112
113
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the report detail similar situations of staff bringing laptops and
phones outside of Canada on official or personal trips.120
2. Digital Trade Zones as Waystations
In this conception of digital trade zones, waystations are
locations where data is transitory. Information will flow through
the zone but not be accessed there. Data may be stored there as
long as necessary until it is repatriated back to the jurisdiction
with the localization requirement. The waystation model would
work by creating space where organizations would be permitted
to add additional privacy and cybersecurity protections to meet
the protection thresholds necessary to handle the data coming
out of a localized jurisdiction. However, the waystation would not
be physically located in that jurisdiction and may even be
situated in a foreign country.
In the case of Canada, the United States could create digital
trade zones that exist as spaces outside of U.S. jurisdiction for
the purposes of privacy laws, similar to how FTZs exist “outside”
the U.S. for the purposes of duty collection on initial imports. In
these zones, organizations would be able to build and operate
servers to handle public data from British Columbia or Nova
Scotia. Since the zones would be outside the jurisdiction of the
United States for the purposes of privacy law, the zones would be
able to be sealed from intrusion by host jurisdiction surveillance
agencies. Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
also known as the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), would
not apply. Law enforcement would not be able to use a warrant
issued under the SCA to access data stored outside the United
States.121 The individual whose data is being stored remains
inviolate because the organization storing the individual’s
information is merely a “caretaker.”122 The right to the data
remains with the individual, in this case in Canada, and the
server itself remains in the digital trade zone thus technically
outside the borders of the United States. With ensured privacy
protection from the United States, organizations operating in the
zone would still need to certify to the relevant province that they
had met the necessary privacy and cyber protection to handle the
province’s public data. Furthermore, the data would not be able
to be accessed in these zones. It would simply be stored there

See generally id.
In re Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain Email Account Controlled and
Maintained by Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 201 (2d. Cir. 2016).
122 Andrew J. Pecoraro, Drawing Lines in the Cloud: Implications of Extraterritorial
Limits to the Stored Communications Act, 51 CREIGHTON L. REV. 75, 95 (2017).
120
121
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until the data was requested back in Canada, at which point it
would be transmitted back to the originating province.
The benefit of the waystation model is that it may be easier,
more cost-effective, and less burdensome to construct, maintain,
and operate a collection of servers in jurisdictions that are not
subject to the localization requirement. In the U.S.–Canada
example, it may be easier to build and operate servers in the
United States, or another country, than it is in Nova Scotia.
For example, in Toronto it costs $1580 per square meter to
build a high-tech factory, the closest type of structure to a data
center mentioned in a recent report on comparative construction
costs.123 Presumably it may be even more expensive to do such
construction in places outside of Canada’s largest city, such as
Nova Scotia. While all U.S. cities in the report were listed as
having higher construction costs than Toronto, numerous other
cities did have lower costs, potentially making them ripe
candidates for using digital trade zones as waystations. Some
notable cities where construction costs are lower than Toronto
include Seoul, Singapore, and Brisbane.124 However, data centers
are different from generic high-tech factories, and so these
general numbers might not encompass the exact cost of
construction for such a specialized facility. In the United States,
it costs on average $43 million to build a data center.125 Costs are
even higher in Brazil ($60.9 million) and Chile ($51.2 million).126
Directly comparable data was not available for Canada. However,
data center construction costs in Brazil and Chile were higher
than the United States, even though construction of high-tech
factories in both of those countries were considerably cheaper
than such construction in the United States.127 This suggests
that there is something intrinsic about the construction of data
centers that makes such construction cheaper in the United
States than abroad. To the extent that such construction is
cheaper in the United States rather than British Columbia
or Nova Scotia, digital trade zones can serve as a way to
promote the domestic construction industry, while also

123 TURNER & TOWNSEND, INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION MARKET SURVEY 2016, at
26 (2016) (comparing construction costs on numerous global cities—Toronto was the only
Canadian city included and U.S. cities covered by the report were New York City,
Houston, San Francisco, and Seattle).
124 See id. at 13.
125 Chander & Le, supra note 17, at 36.
126 Id.
127 See TURNER & TOWNSEND, supra note 123, at 24, 28, 78. Construction costs for a
high-tech factory was $1300 in Brazil and $3500 in Chile. Id. at 24, 28. Comparatively,
according to the report, the city with the lowest cost of construction of a high-tech factory
was Houston at $4272. Id. at 78.
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bringing U.S. organizations in closer proximity to Canadian
information markets.
Construction is not the only driving cost of data centers.
Data centers are exceptionally energy intensive,128 with energy
costs accounting for three-quarters of a data center’s cost of
operation.129 In Canada, data centers use approximately one
percent of the entirety of the country’s energy consumption.130
And, since Canada actually has more expensive electricity than
the United States, small businesses pay, on average, eight
percent more and industrial businesses pay thirty percent more
per kilowatt hour than their southern neighbors.131 Cheap
electricity in the United States may be a reason why businesses
would want to site their data centers in the United States rather
than in Canada. While Canada has 164 data centers, the costs of
operating those centers can be reduced by siting those centers in
the U.S., or by contracting with U.S.–based centers to handle
provincial public information.132 Waystation digital trade zones
would help enable this cross-border data storing to be realized.
C. Digital Trade Zones and Intellectual Property Rights
The practical proposals of digital trade zones as experiments
and waystations only addresses two of the three main types of
digital trade barriers. Digital trade zones could also help advance
national interests in protecting intellectual property. While the
potential for digital trade zones to seriously mitigate intellectual
property rights infringement is reserved for future works, it is
worthwhile to mention one particular way that digital trade
zones guard against intellectual property rights infringement,
even only examining the simple applications presented in the
present work.
The Trade Related Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”)
Agreement, which was created along with the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) at the Uruguay Round, requires
participating states to establish minimum intellectual property
rights standards.133 However, some view the TRIPS Agreement
Swanson, supra note 5, at 715.
Chander & Le, supra note 17, at 37.
130 Data Centres, NAT. RESOURCES CAN., https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/products/
categories/data-centres/13741 [http://perma.cc/4HZKLFQA] (last modified Jan. 19, 2018).
131 See Gerry Angevine & Kenneth P. Green, Paying More for Power: Electricity Costs
in the US and Canada, FRASER INST. iii (May 2014), https://www.fraserinstitute.org/
sites/default/files/paying-more-for-power-rev.pdf [http://perma.cc/M59X-8EJ4].
132 Colocation Canada, DATA CTR. MAP, http://www.datacentermap.com/canada/
[http://perma.cc/22JL-RGUS] (last visited Nov. 7, 2017).
133 See Rachel Brewster, The Surprising Benefits to Developing Countries of Linking
International Trade and Intellectual Property, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2011).
128
129
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minimum standards as insufficient. For example, the TRIPS
Agreement requires that countries make available “enforcement
procedures” against intellectual property rights violations.134
This language stops short of any “affirmative obligation to stop
acts of infringement.”135 This suggests that digital trade zones
may be able to fill gaps in the TRIPS Agreement by denying
violators an opportunity to purloin intellectual property.
One example from a country mentioned in this article is
Canada. Canada remains on the U.S. Trade Representative’s
Special 301 Watch List for a variety of reasons.136 Canada does
not give customs officials authority to “detain, seize, and destroy
pirated and counterfeit goods.”137 Presumably, this limitation
could be extended to goods in digital form, although there
remains a debate about the proper classification of e-products
under the WTO.138 As digitally neutral territory that retain (or
even improve upon) the intellectual property rights regimes of
their host country, digital trade zones offer safe havens for digital
content to be stored without fear of piracy. While the data may be
subject to piracy if it moves across borders and outside the digital
trade zone, digital trade zones can offer intellectual property
protection for the data they hold.
CONCLUSION
In a world with non-tariff restrictions on trade, there is a
truism that speaks to those who desire to negotiate around
these restrictions: to play the game, participants must
give something up. That is, to engage in commerce across borders,
participants—whether they be countries or organizations—must
be prepared to find some compromise. In the context of digital
trade zones this thinking also holds true. Countries seeking to
expand their digital markets might forbear from some jurisdiction
over their territory, internet laws, and surveillance authority in
order to promote the creation of digital trade zones and the
proliferation of e-commerce by domestic organizations. Countries
seeking to protect their domestic technology sectors should also be
134 Agreement Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 41, Apr. 15,
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S 299.
135 Brewster, supra note 133, at 22.
136 Special 301 Report, supra note 32, at 62.
137 Id.
138 See Sam Fleuter, The Role of Digital Products under the WTO: A New Framework
for GATT and GATS Classification, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 153, 158–59 (2016). For the
domestic version of the debate over the classification of digital goods, see ClearCorrect
Operating, LLC v. International Trade Commission, 810 F.3d 1283, 1289–99 (Fed. Cir.
2015), finding that the International Trade Commission lacks authority to exclude patent
infringing digital goods under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. See also Sapna
Kumar, Regulating Digital Trade, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1909, 1924–25 (2015).
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prepared to give up some of the artificial advantage created by
protectionist policies. Privacy remains protected at the level
required by the home jurisdiction and data-based commerce flows
more easily in a trusted environment in the host jurisdiction.
This article has provided some initial thoughts to start a
conversation on digital trade zones; many additional inquiries on
this topic and opportunities for exploration yet exist. A further
investigation of the ways in which digital trade zones could
protect intellectual property rights, especially as data flows
through jurisdictions that do not contain digital trade zones, is
vital. It would also be worthwhile to consider what digital trade
zones might look like in other, non-common law countries. This
article proposed a particular conception of digital trade zones
based off of international maritime law blended with the
procedures of FTZs in the United States. Given the expansiveness
of special jurisdictions throughout the world, what other types of
special jurisdictions could serve as models to improve the
usefulness of digital trade zones or tailor them to even more
specific applications of situations? And is there a different base
framework better suited to the general foundation of the digital
trade zone?
While digital trade zones may never be deployed in the real
world, the underlying principles which would motivate their
consideration and adoption is worth noting. The forbearance of
jurisdiction that would be required to occur in digital trade
zones represents an inherently pro-commerce approach. Where
governments can be persuaded to forbear from protectionist
policies generally, and limit other impeding regulations in certain
narrow cases or jurisdictions, private industry, organizations, and
entrepreneurs can leverage this freedom to create value for the
communities in which they are based.
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